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Abstract—The utilisation of Deep Learning (DL) raises new
challenges regarding its dependability in critical applications.
Sound verification and validation methods are needed to assure
the safe and reliable use of DL. However, state-of-the-art debug
testing methods on DL that aim at detecting adversarial examples
(AEs) ignore the operational profile, which statistically depicts the
software’s future operational use. This may lead to very modest
effectiveness on improving the software’s delivered reliability, as
the testing budget is likely to be wasted on detecting AEs that
are unrealistic or encountered very rarely in real-life operation.
In this paper, we first present the novel notion of “operational
AEs” which are AEs that have relatively high chance to be seen
in future operation. Then an initial design of a new DL testing
method to efficiently detect “operational AEs” is provided, as
well as some insights on our prospective research plan.
Index Terms—Deep Learning robustness, operational profile,
safe AI, robustness testing, software reliability, software testing.
I. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
The field of Verification and Validation (V&V) of Deep
Learning (DL) software has recently enjoyed much activity
and progress, with robustness being one of the properties,
and probably the property, in the limelight. DL Robustness
requires that the decision of the DL model is invariant against
small perturbations on inputs. While definitions of robustness
vary, they share the intuition that all inputs in an input region
η have the same prediction label, where η is usually a small
norm ball (defined in some Lp-norm distance) around an input
x. Inside η, if an input x′ is classified differently to x by the
DL model, then x′ is an adversarial example1 (AE) – a “failure
point” (in the input space) that caused by “bugs”.
All V&V methods for DL robustness are essentially about
detecting AEs. There are emerging studies on systematically
evaluating the AE detection ability of state-of-the-art V&V
methods, e.g. [1]. One of the criteria is naturalness, for which
the work [1] introduces quantitative metrics to assess how
realistic the generated test cases are. Because fixing the AEs
detected by realistic/natural inputs would have more practical
impact on the DL model’s dependability. Indeed, testing DL
models with natural/realistic inputs is neither new nor against
common sense; DeepXplore [2], e.g., uses domain-specific
constraints to generate test cases that are valid and realistic.
1Although named as “adversarial”, x′ could be either a benign input with
perturbations from natural environments or a malicious attack from attackers.
We confine this research to the former, given it is hard to model and predict
attackers’ behaviours by a distribution over the input space.
However, the delivered reliability as a user-centred prop-
erty [3] requires more than just detecting natural/realistic bugs.
A vivid example in [4] shows that it would take 5,000 years
of execution (based on users’ day-to-day operation) to reveal
about one third of the bugs in some tradition software systems.
Clearly, spending all testing budget on detecting those “5,000
years bugs” is unwise. This is also true for DL software: given
a limited testing budget, to reveal as many (potentially rare)
AEs as possible is misleading. We therefore have to focus on
areas in the input space that are more likely to be executed by
users: we want to detect AEs from the high density area of the
Operational Profile (OP) – a probability distribution defined
over the whole input domain quantifying how the software
will be operated [5].
Remarkably, our new “operational AEs” concept is more
stringent than realistic/natural AEs [6]: operational AEs are
realistic/natural, but not vice versa. While studies on detecting
realistic/natural AEs emerge, there is no dedicated techniques
for detecting operational AEs, which motivates this research.
II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Our main objective is to design and implement a new “de-
bug” testing method for DL that ensures the OP information is
explicitly considered, so that the detected AEs have practical
impact on the delivered reliability. Specifically, compared to
the state-of-the-art DL testing methods, we aim to integrate
and optimise the trad-off between the following information:
a) The OP, which is not necessarily the same as the
distribution of existing data (the training and testing datasets)
nor constant after deployment.
b) Naturalness. Ideally the OP returns the probability of
being executed for each point in the input space. However,
practically we might not have a sound OP estimator at the
very fine-grain level for every single input, rather a coarse-
grain level for a “cell” of inputs (e.g. a small norm ball around
a natural point input). Thus, as a fallback solution, we have to
apply quantified naturalness as an approximation to the “local
OP” inside each cell.
c) Gradient of Loss. Generating test cases faithfully accord-
ing to the OP (including naturalness as an approximation of
the “local OP”) is categorised as operational testing, which is
known to be inefficient in detecting bugs [7]. Given a limited
testing budget, e.g. a number of test cases, the gradient of loss
over the input space must be incorporated to fulfil our goal of
detecting as many “operational AEs” as possible.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
To achieve the aforementioned objective, we propose a
five-step iterative solution, as shown in Figure 1. Each step
corresponds to a research question (RQ): given a DL model
and its specific application, we first learn the OP based on
which an operational dataset is synthesised (RQ1). Second, we
design a weight-based sampling algorithm (RQ2) to sample
the “seeds” (of test cases) from the operational dataset. We
then implement a novel fuzzing attacking algorithm guided
by naturalness (RQ3) to generate test cases around each seed.
Based on the AEs detected by test cases, we retrain the DL
model (RQ4). Finally, we assess the reliability of the retrained
DL model (RQ5), where the result indicates how to fine tune
the sampling and attacking algorithms in the next loop. Steps 2
to 5 are repeated until the required reliability level is achieved.
Fig. 1: Workflow of the proposed solution.
Specifically, we investigate the following RQs.
(i) RQ1: How to effectively learn the OP? It is common
that the future OP and the existing dataset used for training are
mismatched. Training data is normally collected in a balanced
way, so that the DL model may perform well in all categories
of input, especially when the OP is uncertain at the time of
training. Given a DL application, in addition to conventional
ways of building the OP [8], we envisage that techniques like
high-fidelity simulation and data augmentation [9] are essential
to speed up the learning and validation of the OP.
(ii) RQ2: How to select seeds that are from high density
areas on the OP and also in the “buggy area” of the input
space? Similar questions are initially answered in [10] by using
weight-based sampling from the operational data set, where
the weights are calculated based on auxiliary information that
indicates which data-points are likely to cause failure.
(iii) RQ3: Given a seed, how to generate test cases that may
efficiently detect AEs considering naturalness? Although exist-
ing attacking algorithms (e.g. [11]) perform well in efficiently
detecting AEs around seeds, constraints on naturalness (local
OPs) needs to be incorporated by new fuzzing algorithms.
(iv) RQ4: How to retrain the DL model based on the
detected operational AEs? Adversarial training provides a
potential solution to the question, yet existing methods ignore
the OP information. Ideally, an enhanced adversarial training
approach would consider both the OP and the detected oper-
ational AEs, while being light-weight.
(v) RQ5: How to accurately assess the delivered reliability
of DL? The reliability assessment result should not only
provide a stopping rule of our testing regime, but also indicate
how to fine tune the sampling and attacking algorithms in RQ2
and RQ3. Our ongoing project [12] provides a preliminary as-
sessment model [13], in which OP information and robustness
evidence are considered to support reliability claims.
IV. FUTURE WORK
In our future work, we plan to develop the new DL testing
tool ourlined in Figure 1 by tackling the five RQs. Although
the potential methods to address each RQ are discussed, it is
challenging to implement those methods and integrate them
into a holistic solution. That said, conducting comprehensive
and rigorous evaluation experiments on our new approach and
comparing the result to state-of-the-art is crucial, not only for
the calibration of our approach but also to test (and hopefully
demonstrate) its superiority, e.g. requiring significant less
amount of test cases to achieve the same level of reliability.
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